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ABSTRACT: In their analyses of controversy, many researchers begin with the assumption that it is a 
juvenile or failed dialectical exchange. In conceptualizing controversy this way, they get caught in an is-
ought dilemma, often shaping controversy into a two-sided affair involving an open issue with arguments 
marshalled but then simultaneously pointing out its shortcomings against these same criteria. As Dascal has 
pointed out, thinking of controversy as a juvenile dialectical exchange seems to be a therapeutic gesture 
that may present it as a better-behaved object of study than experience would support. In this paper, I 
approach controversy first and foremost as a textual object, rather than as a dialectical or argumentative 
one. While I am ultimately interested in the reasoning of participants, I begin by asking how media texts 
represent controversies. I start here because media texts are the dominant channel by which we learn about 
public controversies. Their presentation will have a powerful effect on the ways that the events, arguments, 
participants, and so on are memorialized. In addition, media texts are part of the variegated institutional, 
historical, social, and textual environment in which controversies emerge. In this paper, I analyze the 
reasoning of participants in the Brooklyn Museum controversy as it is presented by in a corpus of media 
texts reporting on the event. I ask the following question: How much and what kinds of reasoning by 
controversy participants do media texts present in this case? In discussing my results I reflect on the role of 
media texts as source material for argument and debate reconstruction. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In previous work on controversy, I showed that direct quotation along with attribution is a 
textual strategy that can be used to identify and authorize a roster of controversy 
participants in coverage (Cramer, 2006). In that work I analyzed the Brooklyn Museum 
controversy, showing that Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was the most prominent participant in 
a coverage corpus. Arnold Lehman, director of the Brooklyn Museum, was the second 
most prominent participant, followed by hundreds of others. In that previous work I 
offered a preliminary analysis of the direct reported speech of Giuliani and Lehman, 
focusing exclusively on their leading quotations. In this paper, I extend and deepen that 
analysis by examining all of the direct reported speech of Giuliani, the most prominent 
participant. In particular, I ask how much and what kind of reasoning is displayed in 
Giuliani’s speech. In order to answer this question, I analyze Giuliani’s statements using 
the five categories of speech acts of Searle, categories that van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst have identified as relevant to the analysis of critical dialogue (Eemeren et 
al., 1996). 
Cramer, P.A. (2007). Participants’ reasoning in controversy coverage. In H.V. Hansen, et. al. (Eds.), 
Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground, CD-ROM (pp. 1-6). Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
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2. DESIGN, METHODS, AND RESULTS 
The Brooklyn Museum controversy corpus contains news texts about the event from the 
top three circulating newspapers in New York City. In order to isolate direct quotations 
and identify speaker attributions, I searched the corpus electronically for direct quotes, 
recorded the speaker to whom the quotation was attributed in each case, and tabulated the 
number of times each speaker was quoted. Finally, I counted and ranked all of the direct 
quotations and the speakers to whom they are attributed in the coverage. 
 Since Mayor Rudolph Giuliani is the most commonly quoted speaker in the 
corpus, his direct reported speech is of particular interest (Cramer, 2006). Not only is 
Giuliani the most prominent speaker in terms of frequency, he is also the most prominent 
in terms of prior public visibility and political entitlement. This should be no surprise. 
Research on media discourse and editorial practice shows that news actors who are 
celebrities and /or possess political entitlements are much more likely to have their 
speech quoted directly than others (Bell, 1991; Roshco, 1975). Whether this general state 
of professional practice squares with principles of fairness and openness in the public 
sphere, norms of objectivity in journalism, or the ideals of liberal democracy are inquiries 
for future papers. Given the fact that Giuliani is the most prominent participant, what is 
important for this investigation is to describe his contributions to the controversy. The 
study asks about reasoning in his direct reported speech since reasoning is a requirement 
of many approaches to critical discussion and deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1984; 
Walton, 1989). 
 Each quotation was coded as an assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, or 
expressive in order to discover the amount and kinds of reasoning in Giuliani’s speech. 
Beyond these categories, I noted the cases where assertives were combined into premiss-
conclusion relationships. These are the cases that counted as reasoning. Though many 
quotations featured full propositions, a number of quotations included only single words. 
In these cases, I reconstructed the proposition based on context. 
 Giuliani is quoted 271 times in the corpus, and reasoning is rare in Giuliani’s 
direct reported speech. The following are the totals for each kind of speech act: 
 
Type of speech act Count 
assertive 207 
commissive 3 
directive  5 
declarative 25 
expressive 7 
(sub-propositional) 24 
Total 271 
 
Most of Giuliani’s statements are assertives. Many of them are statements of value such 
as the following: 
 
(1) “It’s sick stuff.” 
(2) “[The exhibit is an] abominable use of public funds.” 
2 
PARTICIPANTS’ REASONING IN CONTROVERSY COVERAGE 
(3) “The judge is totally out of control.” 
Less common are statements of fact, like these: 
 
(4) “The lease says that this board [of trustees] forfeits its right to run that museum, and 
the museum reverts to the city.” 
In either case they remain statements that he presents as being true, a key criterion of an 
assertion (Fisher, 2004). It is only in the cases where he explicitly limits the attribution of 
a value to himself that he performs an expressive rather than an assertive: 
 
(5) “It offends me.” 
 
Giuliani’s political entitlement helps to explain some of the other speech acts that appear 
in the corpus. For instance, his declaratives illustrate his ability as Mayor to bring states 
of affairs into being through his speech. For instance, he says 
 
(6) “This board is out of business” 
 
In this statement, he is suspending the Board of Directors of the Brooklyn Museum. It is 
his political entitlement that gives this declarative its illocutionary force. 
 While almost all of Giuliani’s statements are assertives, ten of them, either in 
isolation or serial combination, display reasoning. Giuliani’s reasoning seems to engage a 
number of issues concerning the definition of art, the legality of offensive art, and the 
responsibilities of government to fund offensive art. The following example illustrates his 
arguments that define art: 
 
(7) “If I can do it, it’s not art, because I’m not much of an artist. And I could figure out 
how to put this together. You know, if you want to throw dung at something, I could 
figure out how to do that.” 
Giuliani argues that since he is not an artist, and since he could make the painting in 
question, the painting must not be art. The argument depends on a conventional 
understanding of the category “artist”, and reflects Walton’s “verbal classification” 
argument scheme (Walton, 1996). This scheme is vulnerable to begging the question. If 
this were a dialogue, Giuliani would likely be pressed for some additional reasoning to 
support his classification. A number of 20th Century artists and art movements have de-
emphasized craft in favor of concept, and Giuliani’s classification seems to restrict artists 
to those who have mastered a craft. 
In his arguments about the responsibility of government to fund offensive art, 
Giuliani provides reasons for his own actions as Mayor, cutting city funding to the 
Brooklyn Museum: 
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(8) “You don’t have a right to government subsidy for desecrating somebody else’s 
religion, and, therefore, we’ll do everything we can to remove funding for the Brooklyn 
Museum until the director comes to his senses.” 
Here the Mayor argues that he will cut funding for the museum because any entity that 
desecrates religion will not be subsidized by the government. Implicit in the argument is 
the premiss that the museum has desecrated religion. This argument reflects Walton’s 
“established rule” argument scheme, where the arguer appeals to a universal practice that 
he or she expects the audience to share (Walton, 1996). While the established rule could 
be a legal one, Giuliani’s statement, in this case, does not ground the rule in law. The 
argument from established rule is vulnerable to the complaint that the particular rule does 
not apply to the case. If this were a dialogue, Giuliani would likely be pressed for some 
additional reasoning that establishes the implicit premiss, that the museum is desecrating 
religion, along with reasons why the established rule applies to his action to cut funding 
for the museum. The established rule in this case could point to legal precedents that 
restrict governments in the US from funding and promoting religious institutions or 
viewpoints. These precedents could point back to the First Amendment to the 
Constitution and its prohibitions on government establishment of religion. In another of 
Giuliani’s statements, he provides reasoning that suggests some of this grounding: 
 
(9) “We can’t support religion. We shouldn’t support vicious attacks on religion, either.” 
In this bit of reasoning, the Mayor invokes the prior established rule, one that is a 
paraphrase of the First Amendment prohibition on the government establishment of 
religion. This is an a fortiori argument, concluding that by supporting an extreme position 
on religion, we violate the established rule in extreme. To the extent that this argument 
might address the case of the museum, the concerns about the applicability of the 
established rule to the case would remain. 
In another instance of reasoning, Giuliani shifts the facts of the case in order to 
conclude that the desecration that he sees in the controversial painting would be more 
widely appreciated if its target were not a Catholic one: 
 
(10) “If this were desecration of a symbol in another area,” // “I think there would be 
more sensitivity about this than a desecration of a symbol that involves Catholics.” 
The Mayor argues that in general people are sensitive to the desecration of symbols, but 
that there is something special about the symbol in this case that has muted this kind of 
response from the Museum. This reflects Walton’s “argument from bias” argument 
scheme (Walton, 1996). Following this scheme, Giuliani claims that his opponent, the 
Brooklyn Museum, harbors a special bias against Catholics. The “argument from bias” 
scheme is vulnerable to becoming an ad hominem attack. If this were a dialogue, Giuliani 
would likely be asked for some additional reasoning that could establish a conspiracy 
against Catholics that was built into the planning of the painting and/or the exhibit, or that 
was evident in the larger culture. Given that the exhibit was broadly transgressive, 
insulting a number of sacred cows, a special anti-Catholic bias in the Museum might be 
hard for the Mayor to establish. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
The results from this study show that many of Mayor Giuliani’s assertives are directly 
quoted in coverage, but little of his reasoning appears. Those few instances of reasoning 
that do appear provide curious fragments of his argumentative approach to the Brooklyn 
Museum and the painting that he finds offensive. Giuliani exploits three argument 
schemes--”verbal classification,” “established rule”, and “argument from bias”—in order 
to define art, to cut museum funding, and to accuse the museum of being anti-Catholic.  
While these arguments are interesting artifacts for analysis, their relative rarity 
raises some questions about how consequential they might be in light of the rest of 
Giuliani’s statements, the statements of the other participants, and the coverage more 
generally. Consumers of coverage are most likely to encounter his unsupported 
assertions, statements like “It’s sick stuff.” This finding could animate a critique of media 
based on ideals of deliberative democracy, with its premium on argument, or based on the 
norms of dialectic, where reasoning is a prerequisite. However, there is little evidence to 
suggest that media discourse in general actually is or even aspires to be a bastion of 
argumentation, despite the media’s charge to be a creator of and contributor to the public 
sphere. What is surprising about the results of this study is that any of Giuliani’s 
statements contain reasoning. 
One of the central problems illustrated by this study concerns its tools of analysis. 
Is it appropriate to apply methods for dialectical analysis to media texts? Both pragma-
dialectics and argument schemes do seem to serve a useful purpose here in helping to 
understand the kinds of statements and kinds of reasoning attributed to Giuliani. 
However, this analysis is limited by the fact that the Mayor’s statements are fixed in text, 
bounded by the editorial and genre constraints of journalism, and have no explicit 
addressee. In order to apply the methods of dialectical analysis to these texts, we must not 
only reconstruct Giuliani’s arguments but also must construct a dialogue between him 
and other participants. 
Dascal has pointed out that controversies diverge from dialectic exchanges in that 
they slip out of normative bounds (Dascal, 1990). I would build on this notion by 
suggesting that controversies also slip out of the structural and institutional bounds of 
dialectic. Participants often stand at some distance to one another, and their contributions 
to controversy are routinely mediated by journalists. As they are reported for a mass 
audience, controversies feature proximate monologues rather than a coherent dialogue. 
Within those monologues, they feature little of the reasoning that is central to a dialectical 
exchange. Although the tools of dialectical analysis provide powerful methods for 
describing and critiquing dialogues, they stand at some distance from the data in the case 
of controversy coverage. While it is possible to apply them to this data, the evident gaps 
highlight the need for alternative approaches. 
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